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Abstract
This paper is the first to perform a comprehensive estimation of employee stock option
exercise behavior and option cost to firms. We develop a GMM-based methodology, robust
to heteroskedasticity and correlation across exercises, for estimating the rate of voluntary
option exercise as a function of the stock price path and of various firm and option holder
characteristics. We use it to estimate an exercise function from a sample of 870,624 employee-
option grants at 47 publicly-traded firms between 1980–2005, finding that volatility has a
counterintuitive effect, and that men exercise faster than women. We also estimate the rate of
employment termination, which determines forfeitures, cancellations, and forced exercises.
We use the estimated exercise and termination functions in a simulation based valuation
model to analyze the effect of different firm and option holder characteristics on option
value, and show that the true value of these options can differ substantially from values
calculated using the usual FASB approximation.
JEL classification: G14.
With the explosive growth of employee stock options in corporate compensation, in-
vestors, auditors, and regulators have become increasingly concerned about the cost of these
options to shareholders. Recent regulation requiring firms to recognize option cost has inten-
sified the demand for suitable valuation methods. The difficulty is that these are long-lived
American options, so their value depends crucially on how employees exercise them. Yet,
because employees face hedging constraints, standard option theory does not apply.
In standard theory for an ordinary American call, the holder can sell the option at any
time, so it is reasonable to assume that he times the option exercise in order to maximize the
option’s present value. The present value-maximizing exercise policy and its implications for
option value are well-researched (see, for example, Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1973),
or Kim (1990)). However, the holder of an employee stock option cannot sell the option and
typically faces significant hedging constraints. The holder must bear at least part of the
risk of the option payoff, so simply maximizing the option’s present value is generally not
optimal. Indeed, evidence indicates that employees systematically exercise options on non-
dividend paying stocks well before expiration (see, for example, Huddart and Lang (1996),
Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2005)).
As long as the exercise decision generates an option payoff that is subject only to hedge-
able risks, such as stock price risk, and diversifiable risks, such as uncertainties that are
idiosyncratic across employees, then unconstrained market participants can replicate those
payoffs and so pricing by no arbitrage is still possible. The option valuation problem then
reduces to accurately characterizing the option payoffs, that is, the exercise policies of ex-
ecutives. Until recently, however, full-blown estimation has not been possible because of
insufficient data and inadequate methodology. Detailed employee option grant, exercise,
and cancellation data are proprietary and very difficult to obtain for a large number of firms.
In addition, traditional hazard rate models are not suitable for describing voluntary option
exercises, where partial and repeated exercise of options from a given grant is the norm.
This paper is the first to perform a complete empirical estimation of employee stock
option exercise behavior and option cost to firms. We develop a GMM based methodology
for formally estimating the rate of voluntary option exercise as a function of the underlying
stock price path, time remaining to expiration, and firm and option holder characteristics.
This estimation methodology is robust to both heteroskedasticity and correlation across
option exercises. Moreover, unlike regression-based approaches, it never predicts that the
fraction of options exercised in any given period will be less than zero or more than 100%.
We also estimate the rate of employment termination, which forces an option forfeiture if
the option is unvested, a cancellation if it is vested but out of the money, or else an exercise.
Reliable estimation of any option exercise model requires a large sample that includes a
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wide variety of stock price paths. We estimate our model using a comprehensive sample of
option exercise grant and exercise data for all employees at 47 firms from 1980 to 2005. The
proprietary data were provided by corporate participants in a sponsored research project
that was funded by the Society of Actuaries. The methodology presented in this paper is the
first step in developing an actuarial science for valuing compensatory stock options, similar
to that for pension liabilities.
In our estimation we find that the rate of voluntary option exercise is positively related to
the level of the stock price and the imminence of a dividend payment, but positively related
to volatility, in contrast to what standard theory would predict. In addition, the exercise
rate is higher if the stock price is in the 90th percentile of its distribution over the past year
or if the option has just vested. We also find that, holding all else equal, men are more likely
to exercise their options than women.
The estimated exercise function, together with a model for involuntary terminations, can
be combined with Monte Carlo simulation in the usual way to calculate the value of these op-
tions to shareholders, taking the employees’ exercise and termination behavior into account.
This approach is similar to the prepayment modeling and valuation methods developed for
mortgage-backed securities (see, for example, Schwartz and Torous (1989)).
We compare the prices based on our estimation with the adjusted Black-Scholes method
suggested as an approximate valuation technique by the FASB. We find that this FASB
approximation exhibits both significant pricing errors and very different qualitative behavior,
compared with the options’ true value. For example, for the default parameter set for women,
the FASB approximation tells us that the ESO value should decrease as the underlying stock’s
beta increases, while the true value actually increases.
1 Previous Literature
The principles of employee option stock valuation and the need to study exercise behavior are
well-understood in the literature. One approach that has been taken is to model the exercise
decision theoretically. The employee presumably chooses an option exercise policy as part
of a greater utility maximization problem that includes other decisions, such as portfolio,
consumption, and effort choice, and this typically leads to early exercise for the purpose
of diversification. Papers that develop utility-maximizing models and then calculate the
implied cost of options to shareholders include Huddart (1994), Detemple and Sundaresan
(1999), and Ingersoll (2006).
Combining theory and data, papers such as Carpenter (1998) and Bettis, Bizjak, and
Lemmon (2005) calibrate utility-maximizing models to mean exercise times and stock prices
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in the data, and then infer option value. However, these papers provide no formal estimation
and the approach relies on the validity of the utility-maximizing models used. Huddart
and Lang (1996) and Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999) provide more flexible empirical
descriptions of option exercise patterns, but do not go as far as option valuation.
A number of analytic methods for approximating executive stock option value have also
been proposed in the literature. The FASB currently permits using the Black-Scholes formula
with the expiration date replaced by the option’s expected life. Jennergren and Na¨slund
(1993), Carr and Linetsky (2000)), and Cvitanic´, Wiener, and Zapatero (2004) derive analytic
formulas for option value assuming exogenously specified exercise boundaries and stopping
rates. Hull and White (2004) propose a model in which exercise occurs when the stock
price reaches an exogenously specified multiple of the stock price and forfeiture occurs at
an exogenous rate. However, until the accuracy of these methods can be determined, the
usefulness of these methods cannot be assessed.
2 Modeling Exercise Behavior
2.1 Hazard Rates
At first sight, it seems natural to use hazard rates to model the exercise of employee stock
options, since they have often been used in the finance literature to model outwardly similar
events, such as mortgage prepayment (see Schwartz and Torous (1989)) and corporate bond
default (see, for example, Duffie and Singleton (1999)).1 However, whereas it makes sense
to think of the prepayment of one mortgage as being independent of the prepayment of
another (once we’ve controlled for factors like the level of interest rates), ESOs are typically
exercised in blocks. As a result, the exercise of one option in a given grant held by an
individual is extremely highly correlated with the exercise of another option in the same grant
held by the same individual. It is also highly (though less so) correlated with the exercise
of options in other grants held by the same individual. This high degree of correlation
between options makes it difficult to use standard econometric techniques (which assume
independence between events), to estimate hazard rates at the individual option level.2
One attempt to solve this problem was suggested by Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker
1A hazard rate is defined as the likelihood (per period) of an option’s being exercised in the next instant,
conditional on not having being exercised previously. For good introductions to hazard rate analysis, see
Cox (1972) or Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980).
2This issue also arises in modeling corporate bond default. One popular solution, when the number of
firms involved is small, has been to use “copula functions”, which explicitly model this correlation [See,
for example, Li (2001)]. However, in our case the number of options (and hence the number of correlation
coefficients) is too high to be feasible.
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(2006). Instead of using a hazard rate to model the exercise of individual options, they use a
hazard rate to model the exercise behavior of an entire grant of options held by an individual.
Aggregating in this way gets around the problem of correlation between individual option
exercises, but it introduces a new problem. Whereas a hazard rate describes an event with
two states – either something has happened, or it has not – the proportion of an option
grant that exercises in a given period is (almost) a continuous variable, which can take on
any value between 0 and 1. Armstrong et al. (2006) therefore work with the discrete variable
Exercisei,k,t which equals 1 if employee i exercises at least 25% of the vested and unexercised
options in grant k on day t (and at least 10% of all options from the grant); otherwise it
equals zero. This gets over most of the correlation-related problems described above, but
introduces new problems of its own. First, unlike, say, death from a disease, this variable can
equal 1 more than once, so standard hazard rate estimation techniques may not immediately
apply. Second, important information is lost in this aggregation process. For example,
consider two option holders who both have exactly the same likelihood of exercising on any
given date; however, option holder 1 always exercises 25% of the remaining grant whenever
he exercises, whereas option holder 2 always exercises 100% of his remaining options. The
conditional probability of a given option’s being exercised at any instant is four times as
high for options held by option holder 2 versus option 1, so their options are likely to be
worth very different amounts, yet the Exercise variable modeled by Armstrong et al. (2006)
would behave exactly the same way for the two option holders.
2.2 Modeling Fractional Exercise
A solution to all of the problems above is not to use a hazard rate approach at all, but
instead to model the fraction of each grant exercised each period. Heath et al. (1999) follow
this approach, regressing the fraction of each grant exercised against various explanatory
variables. However, their regression approach has some problems. In particular, it may
generate expected exercise fractions that are negative or greater than 100%, both of which
cause problems for valuation.3 One possible solution is to transform the proportion exercised,
such as by using a logistic transformation,
log
(
y
1− y
)
,
which can take on any value between −∞ and +∞, and use this on the right hand side of the
regression. Unfortunately, by Jensen’s inequality, the expected proportion exercising is not
3Attempting to remedy this, for example by truncating the variables, will lead to biases.
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just the inverse transformation of the expected transformed proportion. More important,
this approach cannot handle the (numerous) dates on which there are no options exercised
at all. Heath et al. (1999) also aggregate across individuals, thus discarding potentially
important information about the differences in exercise behavior across individuals.
Like Heath et al. (1999), we also model the fraction of each grant exercised by each
holder each period, but we do so in a manner that always generates consistent estimates
of expected exercise rates that are guaranteed always to be between 0% and 100%, while
explicitly handling the correlation between option exercises within and between different
grants held by the same individual. Our approach, based on the fractional logistic approach
of Papke and Wooldridge (1996), also allows for arbitrary heteroskedasticity in the exercise
rates.
Let yijt be the fraction exercised at time t of grant j held by individual i, and write
yijt = G(Xijtβ) + ijt, (1)
where Xt is some set of covariates in It, the information set at date t, where G, the expected
fraction exercised at date t, is a function satisfying 0 < G(z) < 1, and where
E(ijt | It) = 0,
E(ijt i′j′t′) = 0 if i 6= i′ or t 6= t′.
From now on, we shall use the logistic function,
G(Xijtβ) =
exp(Xijtβ)
1 + exp(Xijtβ)
,
which is easily shown to take on only values between 0 and 1. Note that, while we are
assuming the residuals ijt are uncorrelated between individuals and across time periods, we
are allowing for ijt to be arbitrarily correlated between different grants held by the same
individual at a given point in time, and we are not making any further assumptions about
the exact distribution of ijt, or even about its variance. In particular, unlike assuming a
beta distribution for yijt (see Mullahy (1990) or Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004)), we are
allowing a strictly positive probability that yijt takes on the extreme values zero or one.
As in Papke and Wooldridge (1996), we estimate the parameter vector β using quasi-
maximum likelihood (see Gourie´roux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984)) with the Bernoulli
log-likelihood function,
lijt(β) = yijt log [G(Xijtβ)] + (1− yijt) log [1−G(Xijtβ)] . (2)
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Estimation involves solving
max
β
∑
i,j,t
lijt(β).
The K first order conditions, corresponding to the K elements of β, are given by
∑
i,j,t
dlijt(β)
dβ
=
∑
i,j,t
Xijt
[
G′(Xijtβ)
(
yijt
G(Xijtβ)
− 1− yijt
1−G(Xijtβ)
)]
=
∑
i,j,t
Xijt (yijt −G(Xijtβ)) (3)
= 0.
Equation (1) implies (using iterated expectations) that the population expectation of these
first order conditions is zero, hence this QML estimator, β̂, is a (consistent) GMM estimator
of β, with no assumptions other than Equation (1). Following the notation in Papke and
Wooldridge (1996), define the residual
ûijt ≡ yijt −G(Xijtβ̂),
and define
Ĝijt ≡ G(Xijtβ̂) ≡ ŷijt,
ĝijt ≡ G′(Xijtβ̂).
To allow for heteroskedasticity and for correlation between option grants held by a given
individual, write
var(u) = Ω =

Σ1 . . . 0
. . .
... Σi
...
. . .
0 . . . ΣI

,
where each Σ block corresponds to all of the option grants held by a given individual on a
particular date. Then the asymptotic covariance matrix of β̂ takes the “sandwich” form (see
Gourie´roux et al. (1984)),
var
(
β̂
)
= Â
−1
B̂Â−1,
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where
Â =
∑
i,j,t
∂2lijt(β̂)
∂β∂β′
=
∑
i,j,t
ĝijtXijtX
′
ijt, (4)
and
B̂ = X′Ω̂X,
where X is a matrix containing all of the stacked Xijt values, and Ω̂ is a consistent estimator
of Ω given by
Ω̂ =

Σ̂1 . . . 0
. . .
... Σ̂i
...
. . .
0 . . . Σ̂I

where
Σ̂i = ûiû
′
i.
This covariance matrix is robust both to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and to arbitrary cor-
relation between the residuals in a given block.4
3 Data
As discussed above, our estimation strategy is carried out using a proprietary data set
comprising complete histories of employee stock option grants, vesting structures, and option
exercise and cancellation events for all employees who received options at forty seven publicly
traded corporations between 1980 and 2005.5 As shown in Table 1, there is considerable
heterogeneity in the sample of firms both in terms of their industry type (measured at the one-
digit SIC) and in terms of the firm sizes measured by market cap and numbers of employees.
The largest firms are in the manufacturing sector (SIC 2 and 3) and the transportation and
communications sector (SIC 4). Even within these sectors, however, the heavy manufacturing
4For further discussion of calculating standard errors in the presence of clustering, see Rogers (1993),
Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2003), Wooldridge (2003) and Petersen (2008).
5The data were obtained as part of a research grant written by the authors and funded by the Society
of Actuaries. In addition, we thank Terrence Adamson at AON Consulting who also provided data for this
study.
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sector (SIC 2) experienced significantly different revenue growth rates, with a mean growth
rate of 8.5%, than the computer and measurement sector of manufacturing (SIC 3) with a
mean revenue growth rate of 22.1%. On the whole, the computer high-tech corporations
dominate the SIC 3 sector firms and these are smaller high growth companies over the study
period. The services (SIC 7 and 8), Retail (SIC 5), and Finance, Insurance and Real Estate,
(SIC 6) firms are on average somewhat smaller corporations and the average growth rates for
both the retail and services (SIC 7) firms were in the mid to high twenties over the sample
period. The educational, engineering, and accounting services sector (SIC 8) and the FIRE
sector (SIC 6) both experienced slower growth rates over the period.
Our unit of analysis is an employee-grant-day. For each option grant we merge the
appropriate path of daily split-adjusted stock prices and dividends, starting at the initial
grant date, to the path of outstanding option vesting and exercise events for all grants and
employees. These daily paths are constructed using detailed information on the contractual
option vesting structure, the exercise events, and the cancellation events recorded for each
grant. We track the employee-grant-days and a series of time-varying covariates until the
options in the grant are full exercised, the options are cancelled, or we reach the end of the
sample period of December 30, 2005.
There is significant heterogeneity in the contractual structure of the option grants both
across and within firms in our sample. In Table 2, we report the summary statistics for the
number of grants per employee over the sample period. To preserve the anonymity of the
firms, we report the summary statistics by two-digit SIC groupings using the SIC designation
for each firm that is reported in CRSP. As shown in the Table 2, there is considerable
variability in the numbers of grants per employee across firms. The mean number of grants
per employee ranges from 1.61 grants for firms in the Educational Services sector (SIC 82)
to 5.64 grants per employee in the retail sector. There is also considerable variability within
sectors where the number of grants per employee ranges from one to as many as sixty four
in the chemicals and allied products sector (SIC 28). For the firms, where we have the
employee ranking of the employee, the largest grant recipients are typically the CEO or
senior managers.
Another feature of the option granting structure is the number of options that are as-
sociated with each grant. As shown in Table 3, there is again considerable variability both
across industry sectors and within firms. The number of options have been multiplied by
the ratio of the firms stock price to the global average stock price so that summary statis-
tics control for the effect of relatively valuable options where the grants are small and large
grants when the stock price is relatively low compared to the sample average. As shown,
the mean standardized grant sizes are largest in the chemicals and allied products sector
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(SIC 28), communications (SIC 48), and industrial machinery and computers sector (SIC
35). The range of the standardized option grant sizes is also large. For example, in the retail
sector (SIC 59) the number of options per grant ranges from 0.5 to more than seventeen
million standardized and split-adjusted options in a single grant. The combined effects of
the large number of grants per employee and the size of these grants implies that individual
employees are likely to hold large inventories of options with different strikes and vesting
structures. This feature of the data introduces significant correlation across the exercise
decisions of individual employees. As discussed above, the exercise decision for one option in
a given grant held by an individual is highly correlated with the exercise of another option
in the same grant held by the same individual. In addition, there would be correlation in the
exercise decisions across grants that are held by the same individual. A particular strength
of our fractional logistic estimator is that is does not require assumptions of independence
across exercise events. We also pool by employee and correct our standard errors to account
for our pooled structure.
Table 4 provides summary statistics for the maximum number of contractual vesting
dates required before the options in a given grant fully vest. The means range between 1
for the petroleum, refining and related sector (SIC 29) and 11.75 for firms in the electronic
and other electrical sector (SIC 36). Here again, the range of vesting structures across firms
within a sector are very important. An example of a vesting structure that would lead to
a large maximum would be a grant with a 25% vest at the end of the first year and then
2.08% monthly vests over the next 36 months. The minima are generated by what are
termed “cliff vests” where all the options in a given grant vest on the same day. Another
feature of the grants that exhibits important heterogeneity across firms is the percentage of
options that vest on the first vesting dates. As shown in Table 5, the range of the mean
percentage of options that vest on the first vesting date is between 20% to 100% across the
SIC defined sectors. The within sector variance is also important and the percentage of the
grants that vest on the first vesting date ranges between 1% to 100%. An 100% vest is
also associated with the common “cliff vest” structure and these vests can occur within one
month of issuance.
The summary statistics for the overall time that it takes to fully vest the grants are
reported in Table 6. As shown, the mean number of months required for the grants to fully
vest is between 7.11 months in the communications sector (SIC 48) and 59.99 months in
the educational services sector (SIC 82). The within sector variation is between zero, in
which case the grant fully vests on the first grant date, to a maximum of 121 months in the
communications sector (SIC 48). The only homogeneous contractual feature of employee
stock option grants across firms is the maturity in months from the issuance date to the date
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of expiry. As shown in Table 7, the term of executive stock options is quite uniformly ten
years although there are some twenty year and one year maturity options granted on the
part of some firms. At the employee-level, the employees in our sample are in some cases
managing as many as ten different contractual option vesting structures in their inventory
of options.
The vesting structure also affects the observed patterns of exercise events. Table 8
presents the summary statistics for the remaining term on the option at the time the option
is exercised. Since on average the options in our sample have terms of ten years, these high
mean values imply that on average the options in our sample are exercised when there is
nearly two-thirds of the option term remaining. These patterns are consistent with those
documented by Huddart and Lang (1996). The only sector that does not exhibit this persis-
tent early exercise behavior on the part of employees is fabricated metal products (SIC 34).
The summary statistics reported in Table 9 suggest that on average the options are exercised
close to the vesting dates, controlling for the number of days in the interval that the option
was in-the-money. The chemicals and allied products firms (SIC 28) and communications
(SIC 48) sectors, however, appear to be exceptions to this pattern with mean times between
the prior vesting date and the exercise date of 1,205.4 and 1830 days respectively.
Table 10 reports the summary statistics for the ratio of the stock price to the exercise
price on the option. Not at all surprisingly, these ratios are all greater than one, but again
there is very important variation in the ratios both across and within sectors. The very high
ratios reflect the run-up in the stock market during our sample period. Overall, both the
vesting structure and the option exercise patterns lead to the persistence of early exercise
behavior in some industrial sectors but with considerable heterogeneity both within and
across the sectors.
Another characteristic that we document in these data is the importance of fractional
exercise behavior. As shown in Table 11, the mean percentage of vested options in a grant
that are exercised is significantly less than one across all the industry sectors. The means
range from about 30% in the miscellaneous retail sector (SIC 59) to a high of about 92% in
the electric, gas, and sanitary services sector (SIC 49). There is also consider heterogeneity
within firms in the industry sectors. Thus, on average employees typically exercise less than
100% of the outstanding vested options of a grant even though all the vested options in the
grant would also be in-the-money. It is this central feature of option exercise behavior that
motivates the development of our fractional logistic estimation strategy.
In summary, there are three features of the stock option exercise patterns observed in our
sample of 870,624 option grants and 429,371 option exercises. First, many employees hold
more than one option grant and make exercise decisions over more than one vested option at
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any given time. For this reason, estimation strategies must account for the correlated decision
structure of employee option exercise. Second, both the contractual vesting structure and the
exogenous price paths appear to have strong effects on option exercise patterns, thus careful
controls for both of these feature on a daily basis must be included in a successful estimation
strategy. Finally, most option positions are exercised fractionally, that is the proportion of
the outstanding options that are exercised at exercise events is, on average, substantially
less than one. For this reason, a successful econometric methodology must account for path
dependent fractional exercise behavior or risk introducing significant misspecification bias
and inaccurate forecasts of exercise timing.
3.1 The covariates
As discussed at length in our companion paper, Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace (2008),
since employee stock options are non-transferable, the optimal exercise policy for these op-
tions can look quite different from that for standard American call options. The intuition
that the need for diversification can lead an employee to sacrifice some option value by ex-
ercising early is well understood in the theoretical literature. However, an explicit theory
of the optimal exercise of executive stock options that could be taken directly to data is
still developing. Formal theory of the optimal exercise of multiple executive stock option
grants is even less developed, although intuition suggests that the greater the option holder’s
total forced exposure to the stock risk, the greater the exercise rate. Despite the potential
limitations of prior theoretical research, we consider two types of path-dependent covariates
in our empirical specification of fractional exercise timing. We use both fundamental state
variables that have appeared in prior theoretical analyzes of optimal stock option exercise
policies as well as “behavioral” variables that have been identified in recent empirical op-
tions exercise studies (See Huddart and Lang (1996); Heath et al. (1999); Huddart and Lang
(2003); Malmendier and Tate (2005); and Armstrong et al. (2006)).
Even the most parsimonious theoretical models define the optimal exercise policies of
executive stock options in terms of the time series dynamics of the underlying stock price
in conjunction with the contractual timing of options’ vesting structures and the timing of
expirations. Successful development of empirical models of exercise timing require richer
theoretical treatments of the exercise function in terms of variables such as the wealth of
the option holder, the holdings of other options and restricted stock, the volatility of the
underlying stock price, the portion of risk that is hedgeable using other assets, and the
dividend payout structure of the firm. Unfortunately, the theoretical literature that focuses
on these richer models is not well developed. The broader theoretical framework of Carpenter
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et al. (2008) allows for a number of empirically testable predictions concerning the average
lives of employee stock options, and we draw upon a number of these predictions to motivate
the our specification choices for our fractional logistic estimator. A first strong result from
the model is that the higher the firm’s dividend rate the more likely that the employee will
exercise, since loss of dividend through option ownership is a cost of the option that could
be avoided through exercise. A second prediction is that the higher correlation of the stock’s
price with the market (the higher beta), the less likely that exercise will occur. In addition
we find that, unlike the standard intuition for the exercise of American calls, volatility does
not lead to a clean prediction and may lead both to earlier or later exercise in the case of non-
transferable stock options.6 For this reason, we consider the effect of stock price volatility on
the optimal exercise policy as an open empirical question. Standard intuition holds that risk
averse employees are likely to exercise later and the cost of their options is higher. Similarly,
employees with decreasing absolute risk aversion will exercise later, implying greater option
cost, if they have more non-option wealth and this intuition is again supported in Carpenter
et al. (2008). This final prediction not only requires information on the stock price paths
but also requires proxies for the risk preferences of the employees who hold the options.
In Table 12 we present the summary statistics for the path dependent covariates. The
first four rows of the table present the common state variables in theoretical analyzes of
optimal employee option exercise policies. The price to strike ratio is the employee-grant-
day observation of the ratio of the split-adjusted price of the stock to the split-adjusted strike
price on the option (the zero valued minimum is due to our reporting precision). The stock
return volatility is the standard deviation of the daily stock returns, as reported in CRSP,
over the prior thirty trading days from each employee-grant-day. The dividend payment is
equal to the next split-adjusted dividend divided by the current share price during the 14
days up to each dividend payment, and is equal to zero on all other days. The firm beta was
estimated for each firm using market and firm data from CRSP and interest rate data from
the Federal Reserve Board over a five year interval (in some cases the interval is shorter)
and is a constant for each firm. The estimated mean beta is about 1.00 and the standard
deviation is about .31 over the sample period.
Recent empirical studies of employee stock option exercise report links between behavioral
indicators, or “rules of thumb”, that employees appear to rely upon in making their option
exercise decisions. Armstrong et al. (2006) find a statistically significant association between
the timing of vesting events and option exercise. They argue that recent exercise events both
mechanically affect an employees’ ability to exercise their options and may also serve as a
6Option values increase in volatility in both standard option pricing theory and in the case of executive
stock option models with an exogenously specified exercise boundary Cvitanic´ et al. (2004).
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periodic reminder to employees to evaluate the value of their option positions. Heath et al.
(1999) and Armstrong et al. (2006) also find a statistically significant positive association
between option exercise and the occurrence of the current stock price exceeding the 90th
percentile of the past year’s price distribution. They argue that this association is driven by
cognitive benchmarks that employees use in their decision rules. Given the importance of
these variables in prior studies, we also include them as controls in all of our specifications.
Our measure of vesting structure is the variable vesting period within two weeks. It is an
indicator variable that is one if the employee-grant-day is within two weeks of a vesting event
and zero otherwise. Our cognitive benchmark proxy is the variable price relative to the 90th
percentile. It is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the observed stock price is greater
than or equal to 90th percentile of the stock price distribution over the prior year of trading
and zero otherwise. We report the summary statistics for these variables in the lower panel
of Table 12. As shown in the table, about 2% of employee-grant-days are within two weeks
of a vesting date, on average, and about 59% of the employee-grant-days are at prices that
exceed the 90th percentile of the past year’s price distribution, reflecting the large stock
price run-ups in the sample period.
A prior empirical literature has found evidence that older individuals are more risk averse
in financial decision making than younger individuals and that females appear to be more risk
averse than males in their financial decisions (See Bajtelsmit and Bernasek (2001); Bellante
and Green (2004); and Armstrong et al. (2006)). As previously discussed, economic intuition
suggests that less risk averse employees are likely to exercise later and consequently the cost
of their options is greater. For a subset of firms in our sample, we have information on
the age, sex, and salary of the employees. The summary statistics for these variables are
reported in Table 13. As shown, the subset of the data that includes salary is quite small.
The mean salary is about $160,000 (the median about $75,000) and there is significant range
between about $9,800 and $36 million dollars in annual salary. We have information for a
subset of about sixty two thousand employees and as shown in the table the mean age is
about forty three years old. Surprisingly, the youngest option recipient is only seventeen
years old and the oldest is eighty five years old. In a somewhat smaller subsample, we have
information about the gender of the employee and their employment status. Sixty eight
percent of the subsample is male. About 8% of the employees are executives and about
3% are board members. The manager category (about 40% of the subsample) includes
all employees who have manager as their employment designation and the other category
includes all administrative personnel, logistics personnel, and engineers among many other
categories. Our expectation is that, everything else equal, women and older employees will
exercise later and that the larger non-diversifiable wealth positions of executives will lead
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them to exercise earlier.
In Table 14, we report the frequencies of option cancellation events. These covariates
are important in the valuation simulations since they add three additional reasons for option
terminations and they have potentially important effects on the probability of option exercise.
The employee stock options in our sample can be cancelled for four reasons: repricing, death,
retirement, and termination from the firm for either voluntary or involuntary reasons. Since
we only observed about 4,000 repricings in the sample we ignored the effects of these events.
Cancellations as the result, of death, retirement and job termination would be expected to
force early option exercise since employees are required to relinquish their option positions
within 60 days of any of the three events. For this reason, we drop all exercises within a six
month window of these events, since presumably these exercises are motivated only in part
by the current draw on the stock price path. As shown in Table 14, there are a large number
of cancellation events where we were not provided with the reason for the cancellation. Of
the 222,168 employees for whom we have cancellation information, the most common reason
was job termination. We also had three hundred retirements and one thousand eight hundred
and thirty deaths.
In summary, the covariates used in the fractional logistic specification include the salient
state variables related to stock price paths, volatility, and market risk that have been the
focus of the recent theoretical literature on employee stock option valuation and cost. In
addition, we proxy for factors such as risk aversion and possible cognitive benchmarks using
the covariates gender, age, salary, and employment status. We use this rich set of covariates
to explore a set of theoretically motivated null hypotheses that have appeared in the recent
literature. These nulls include: 1) higher dividend rates should make option exercise more
likely; 2) more risk aversion should make early option exercise more likely; 3) higher volatility
is an empirical question, since theoretically it could lead to either earlier or later exercise in
a utility maximizing framework; 4) higher correlation with the market makes earlier exercise
less likely; and 5) an employee’s optimal exercise policy may involve exercising when the
stock price exceeds a critical boundary. We report the results of these tests in the next
section of the paper.
4 Estimation Results
Table 15 shows the results of applying our procedure to the sample of voluntary option exer-
cises described above. We report our results for four alternative specifications. Specifications
1 and 2 are estimated on the full sample but excludes age and sex. Specification 1 excludes
firm fixed effects and specification 2 includes them. Specifications 3 and 4 are estimated on
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a smaller sub-sample of firms that included information on the age and sex of the employee.
Specification 3 excludes firm fixed effects and specification 4 includes them. The standard
errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and the estimator clusters
at the level of the individual employee.
As shown in the table, the rate of voluntary option exercise is consistently positively
related to the level of the stock price as expected. As previously discussed, Carpenter
et al. (2008) argue that unlike the standard intuition for the exercise of American calls,
volatility does not lead to a clearly signed prediction on an employee’s optimal exercise
policy. The results reported in Table 15 indicate that once we introduce controls for firm
fixed effects, increased levels of stock return volatility are associated with larger fractions
of options exercised. These results suggest that the employee’s seek to minimize the costs
associated with holding an undiversified option portfolio so they exercise their options as
risk increases.
The effect of the timing of dividend payments on the fraction of options exercised appears
to be very sensitive to controls for possible differential risk aversion associated sex and age.
The theoretical prediction is that the higher the firm’s dividend rate, the more likely it is
that the employee will exercise, since the loss of dividend is a cost to option ownership. We
find a statistically significant and positive effect only in specification 4 where we control for
both firm fixed effects, sex, and age.7 Specification 4 is our preferred specification. However,
these results suffer from the important caveat that the subsample used for estimation is
considerably smaller than the full sample. Another potential limitation with our dividend
measure is that many firms did not pay dividends during out sample period, which includes
the technology driven stock price boom.
Our prediction that the more highly the stock’s price is correlated with the market, the
less likely that exercise will occur, is not consistently borne out across the four specifications.
As shown in Table 15, the coefficient estimate on firm beta is negative and statistically
significant in specification 1 with no fixed effects and the coefficient is negative but not
statistically significant in the sub-sample results that are reported as specification 4.8 We
interpret this result as only weak support of our ex ante expectations concerning the effect
of beta on executive stock option exercise.
As reported in Table 15, with the exception of the results in specification 2, when the
stock price is greater than or equal to the 90th percentile of the trading price distribution in
the prior three hundred and sixty trading days, the fraction of options that are exercised is
7We do not yet have usable standard errors for specification 2 with firm fixed effects.
8Part of the problem with the firm beta covariate is that we are currently measuring a fixed beta for each
firm. In later versions of this paper, we plan to use annual estimates of firms’ betas using CRSP aggregate
files
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also statistically significant and positive. We also find a statistically significant and positive
association between the percentage of options that are exercised and recent vesting events,
measured by an indicator of whether the exercise event was within a two week window of the
last vesting date. As discussed previously, these results are consistent with the earlier em-
pirical studies of Heath et al. (1999) and Armstrong et al. (2006), who argue that employees
may tie their exercise decisions to cognitive benchmarks as a means of reducing monitoring
costs. The exercise of vested options in a grant is also statistically associated with the re-
maining time on the option. Without controls for age and sex, our results indicate that the
more days until maturity the more likely that employees exercise large fractions of vested
outstanding options in a grant. However, after controlling for age and sex, this coefficient
changes sign, suggesting that our proxies for risk aversion are confounded with the effects of
the remaining term.
Since we only have a sub-set of firms that reported the age and sex of their employees,
our preferred specification 4 is based on a substantially smaller number of employee grant
days than the full sample. In specifications 3 and 4, as seen in Table 15, we find that age
has a statistically significant and negative effect on the percentage of vested options that are
exercised. Controlling for firm fixed effects in specification 5, however, we find that men are
more likely to exercise large fractions of options. These effects suggest that the options costs
associated with older and female employees would be higher since the life of their options is
longer.
In summary, the covariates related to the stock price paths, the dividend payouts, and
market risk have the expected sign with appropriate controls for firm fixed effects, age, and
sex. We also sign the effects of stock return volatility and find that it has a positive effect on
early exercise which is at variance with standard intuition on the optimal exercise policies
associated with American call options. In addition, the contractual vesting structure of
executive stock option contracts was found to have an important effect on option exercise
behavior, since we find that options that have just vested are more likely to exercise. Finally,
there appear to be important differences in the exercise behavior of employees by age and
sex. Men are more likely to exercise larger fractions of options early and older employees
appear to hold their options. These differential effects on life of the options would also be
expected to affect option cost which we address with simulations in the next section.
5 Option Cost to the Firm
For an individual option, the exercise function describes the expected proportion of each
outstanding option grant to be voluntarily exercised at a given time and state, conditional on
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having survived to that point. If the event that the option is actually exercised is sufficiently
independent across option holders with identical exercise functions, conditional on the given
time and state, then in a large enough pool of such option holders, the fraction of options
exercised voluntarily will exactly equal the exercise function. Similarly, the termination
function describes the fraction of options stopped through termination in a diversified pool.
We assume that such diversification is possible, or, more generally, that the conditional
variance in the number of options actually exercised around the expected value is not a
priced risk in the market, so that option valuation proceeds as if perfect diversification were
possible.
Given the estimated exercise rate per period, G, the value of the option is given by its
expected risk-neutral discounted payoff,
Ot = E
∗
t
∫ T
t
e−r(τ−t)
(
Sˆτ −K
)+
Gˆτe
− R τt Gˆs ds dτ, where
dSˆ/Sˆ = (r − δ) dt+ σ dZ.
To understand the intuition for this expression, note that G measures the expected fraction
of a grant exercising, measured as a fraction of the options still unexercised one period earlier.
To calculate the expected fraction of today’s options that exercise at date t, we therefore
need to multiply by the proportion of the grant outstanding today that has not exercised
prior to t, given by
e−
R τ
t Gˆs ds dτ.
We estimate this value with Monte Carlo simulation, using antithetic variates and im-
portance sampling to increase precision. Table 16 reports option values, labeled ESO Value,
for a variety of parameterizations, assuming the option holder voluntarily exercises accord-
ing to the exercise rate function estimated in specification (4) of Table 15, and in addition
terminates employment at a constant rate. For the base case, we set the employee age,
termination rate, vesting period, stock return volatility, and dividend rate equal to their
sample average values and we set the firm beta to one and option expiration date to ten
years. Throughout the table, option values for the male employee are slightly lower than for
the female employee because males have a higher exercise rate.
For comparison, the column labeled FASB Approx gives option value approximated as the
probability of vesting times the Black-Scholes value adjusted for dividends, with contractual
expiration date replaced by the option’s expected life, conditional on vesting. While new
methodologies are developing, the FASB accepts this approximation for accounting valuation,
and it is used by the vast majority of firms. Like ESO Value, we compute the option’s
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expected life using Monte Carlo simulation assuming the option holder follows the estimated
exercise rate function and terminates employment at a constant rate. This expectation is
with respect to the true probability measure, so it depends on the true expected return on
the stock. We assume the mean stock return is determined by the CAPM, with a 6% excess
expected return on the market.
In theory, the FASB approximation can either understate or overstate the true option
value, depending on the exercise policy. To understand why, consider two special cases,
and for simplicity assume immediate vesting. First, if the option holder follows the value-
maximizing exercise policy in the presence of dividends, as in standard theory, then the true
option value will be greater than the Black-Scholes value to any deterministic expiration
date, so it will exceed the FASB approximation. Alternatively, suppose the option is stopped,
either through exercise or cancellation, at a purely exogenous rate, independent of the stock
price, without regard to whether it is in or out of the money. Then the true option value is
the average Black-Scholes value over possible stopping dates, while the FASB approximation
is Black-Scholes value to the average stopping date, and since the Black-Scholes value tends
to be concave in the option expiration date, the FASB approximation will overstate the true
value. The exercise policies followed in practice contain elements of both of these examples.
The first panel of Table 16 shows how option value varies with the termination rate.
Higher termination rate increases the chance of pre-vesting forfeiture, the chance of post-
vesting cancellation, and the rate of suboptimal early exercise, so it reduces option value.
It also reduces option life, so the FASB approximation also declines. The increased noise in
the exercise policy should in principle increase the FASB overstatement, but here that effect
is only slight.
The second panel of Table 16 illustrates the effect of increasing the vesting period. A
longer vesting period increases the risk of pre-vesting forfeiture, which reduces option value.
Conditional on vesting, the option stopping time has less room to vary, so the difference
between the option value and the FASB approximation shrinks.
The third panel of Table 16 presents volatility effects. Because higher volatility increases
the exercise rate, option value increases much more slowly than standard theory would pre-
dict. It even increases more slowly than the FASB value, which accounts for the reduced
expected option life, so that the overstatement increases significantly with volatility. The
fourth panel shows that option value declines with the dividend rate. The FASB approxi-
mation declines even faster so the error declines in algebraic value.
The fifth panel of Table 16 shows the effect of increasing firm beta. This reduces the
exercise rate, perhaps because of increased hedging opportunities, which increases option
value. Beta has conflicting effects on option expected life. On one hand, its direct effect on
18
the estimated exercise function is to reduce the exercise rate, which can increase expected
life. On the other hand, under the true measure, it increases the mean stock return, which
means the exercise function is more likely to be evaluated at higher stock prices, which
increases the exercise rate and reduces expected option life. For the male employee, the first
effect dominates, and the FASB approximation error is relatively constant. However, for the
female employee, who has the lower overall rate of exercise, the second effect dominates, so
that the FASB approximation actually moves in the opposite direction as the true value,
and the error declines monotonically in algebraic value.
6 Conclusions
This paper is the first to perform a complete empirical estimation of employee stock option
exercise behavior and option cost to firms. We develop a methodology for estimating option
exercise and cancellation rates as a function of the stock price path, time to expiration,
and firm and option holder characteristics. Our estimation is based on a fractional logistic
approach, and accounts for correlation between exercises by the same executive. Valuation
proceeds by using the estimated exercise rate function to describe the option’s expected
payoff along each stock price path, and then computing the present value of the payoff. The
estimation of empirical exercise rates also allows us to test the predictions of theoretical
models of option exercise behavior.
We apply our estimation technique to the largest dataset yet analyzed in the litera-
ture, consisting of a comprehensive sample of option exercise grant and exercise data for all
employees at 47 publicly traded firms from 1980 to 2005. Our results indicate that using
standard pricing approximations, such as the adjusted Black-Scholes method suggested by
FASB, can lead to significant errors. The proprietary data used in this study were provided
by corporate participants in a sponsored research project that was funded by the Society of
Actuaries, who hope that the results of our study will eventually be used as the standard set
of exercise assumptions to be used in calculating ESO values on firms’ income statements.
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Table 2: Number of Grants Per Employee
This table provides the summary statistics over the sample period for the number of grants that were received
by each employee in the forty seven firms. We organize the summary statistics by the two-digit firm-level
SIC categories as reported in CRSP.
Industry Number of Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Employees Deviation
Chemicals and allied products 180681 2.23 1.52 1.00 64.00
Petroleum refining and related 166 3.11 3.06 1.00 16.00
Rubber and plastics products 156 2.29 2.79 1.00 18.00
Primary metal industries 5498 3.60 3.50 1.00 34.00
Fabricated metal products 127 2.00 1.87 1.00 18.00
Industrial machinery and computers 30535 2.13 1.32 1.00 33.00
Electronic and other electrical 8075 3.85 3.18 1.00 39.00
Transportation equipment 254 3.69 2.31 1.00 10.00
Measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments 5124 2.45 2.32 1.00 22.00
Miscellaneous manufacturing 5600 3.13 2.53 1.00 18.00
Communications 120119 1.79 1.40 1.00 34.00
Electric, gas, and sanitary services 375 4.64 3.32 1.00 12.00
Wholesale trade - Durable goods 455 2.06 1.61 1.00 11.00
Wholesale trade - Non-durable goods 4275 4.18 3.08 1.00 16.00
General merchandise stores 1929 4.29 3.39 1.00 17.00
Eating and drinking places 3091 2.60 1.91 1.00 20.00
Miscellaneous retail 10231 5.64 4.98 1.00 30.00
Brokers, dealers,and exchanges 1823 3.62 3.24 1.00 27.00
Business services 3144 3.17 2.72 1.00 48.00
Amusement and recreation services 504 2.76 2.04 1.00 14.00
Educational services 2614 1.61 1.65 1.00 26.00
Engineering, accounting, and management services 855 4.78 3.14 1.00 14.00
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Table 3: Number of Options Per Grant
This table reports the number of options per grant at issuance. We multiply the total number of shares
granted times the ratio of the price of the stock at the date of issuance to the sample average stock price at
the date of issuance (Si/S¯), where (S¯) is the global average stock price over all the firms in the sample. The
summary statistics are computed over all grants in the sample period. We organize the summary statistics
by the two-digit firm-level SIC categories as reported in CRSP.
Industry Number Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
of Grants Deviation
Chemicals and allied products 403811 1,015.2 9,928.6 0.2 3,308,325.8
Petroleum refining and related 516 3,408.1 3,163.9 145.4 24,915.8
Rubber and plastics products 358 24,775.5 64,514.3 227.8 918,803.0
Primary metal industries 19814 5,704.1 27,240.9 1.1 1,454,373.6
Fabricated metal products 254 4,947.5 7,204.4 84.6 70,435.6
Industrial machinery and computers 64900 6,506.3 63,081.0 0.5 6,136,619.3
Electronic and other electrical 31117 3,547.7 23,709.4 1.4 1,712,959.0
Transportation equipment 937 6,525.9 12,405.2 391.0 148,884.6
Measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments 12554 3,077.7 12,370.8 14.6 641,626.9
Miscellaneous manufacturing 17549 5,714.7 39,731.4 33.2 3,036,514.4
Communications 214621 785.0 8,680.1 0.4 1,442,160.2
Electric, gas, and sanitary services 1740 3,646.6 4,360.0 272.0 85,366.1
Wholesale trade - Durable goods 936 2,733.1 11,404.7 33.9 233,971.4
Wholesale trade - Non-durable goods 17871 3,480.4 18,145.7 9.4 1,650,241.0
General merchandise stores 8276 14,364.3 60,144.7 66.0 2,004,211.9
Eating and drinking places 8041 3,855.9 15,458.4 1.2 411,897.9
Miscellaneous retail 57652 4,242.3 91,337.2 0.5 17,560,983.5
Brokers, dealers,and exchanges 6602 1,837.9 4,453.7 123.2 198,281.6
Business services 9975 6,071.6 41,742.7 2.6 1,214,947.0
Amusement and recreation services 1393 8,667.4 25,531.3 329.3 286,108.5
Educational services 4221 761.7 3,065.0 5.1 67,650.7
Engineering, accounting, and management services 4086 3,196.4 13,331.4 52.0 347,417.4
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Table 4: Maximum Number of Vesting Periods per Grant
This table reports the maximum number of vesting periods required to fully vest a given option grant. The
summary statistics are computed over all grants in the sample period. We organize the summary statistics
by the two-digit firm-level SIC categories as reported in CRSP.
Industry Number Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
of Grants Deviation
Chemicals and allied products 403811 1.19 2.26 1.00 43.00
Petroleum refining and related 516 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Rubber and plastics products 358 3.05 0.21 3.00 4.00
Primary metal industries 19814 3.58 1.04 1.00 4.00
Fabricated metal products 254 2.19 1.89 1.00 6.00
Industrial machinery and computers 64900 3.97 0.65 2.00 6.00
Electronic and other electrical 31117 11.75 13.81 1.00 49.00
Transportation equipment 937 2.91 0.42 1.00 3.00
Measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments 12554 9.15 14.01 1.00 48.00
Miscellaneous manufacturing 17549 3.41 0.49 3.00 4.00
Communications 214621 1.07 0.45 1.00 4.00
Electric, gas, and sanitary services 1740 3.00 0.00 3.00 3.00
Wholesale trade - Durable goods 936 3.00 0.00 3.00 3.00
Wholesale trade - Non-durable goods 17871 2.44 1.22 1.00 5.00
General merchandise stores 8276 4.03 0.21 3.00 7.00
Eating and drinking places 8041 3.51 1.88 1.00 5.00
Miscellaneous retail 57652 3.04 1.11 1.00 34.00
Brokers, dealers,and exchanges 6602 3.00 0.12 1.00 8.00
Business services 9975 5.09 4.98 1.00 28.00
Amusement and recreation services 1393 3.86 0.63 1.00 4.00
Educational services 4221 5.00 0.00 5.00 5.00
Engineering, accounting, and management services 4086 3.00 0.00 3.00 3.00
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Table 5: Percentage of the Options that Vest on the First Vesting Date
This table reports the percentage of the option grants that vest on the first vesting date. The summary
statistics are computed over all grants in the sample period. We organize the summary statistics by the
two-digit firm-level SIC categories as reported in CRSP.
Industry Number Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
of Grants Deviation
% % % %
Chemicals and allied products 403811 97.14 13.30 12.50 100.00
Petroleum refining and related 516 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00
Rubber and plastics products 358 32.94 1.77 25.00 33.33
Primary metal industries 19814 35.54 26.06 25.00 100.00
Fabricated metal products 254 74.80 35.92 16.67 100.00
Industrial machinery and computers 64900 26.15 6.27 16.67 50.00
Electronic and other electrical 31117 28.56 15.87 20.00 100.00
Transportation equipment 937 36.39 13.96 33.33 100.00
Measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments 12554 26.38 21.02 2.08 100.00
Miscellaneous manufacturing 17549 29.95 4.09 25.00 33.33
Communications 214621 98.28 10.06 1.15 100.00
Electric, gas, and sanitary services 1740 33.30 0.00 33.30 33.30
Wholesale trade - Durable goods 936 33.33 0.00 33.33 33.33
Wholesale trade - Non-durable goods 17871 44.83 33.37 20.00 100.00
General merchandise stores 8276 24.83 1.06 14.29 33.33
Eating and drinking places 8041 48.85 38.09 20.00 100.00
Miscellaneous retail 57652 33.43 1.95 25.00 100.00
Brokers, dealers,and exchanges 6602 59.81 2.44 25.00 100.00
Business services 9975 27.06 11.02 20.00 100.00
Amusement and recreation services 1393 28.50 15.82 25.00 100.00
Educational services 4221 20.00 0.00 20.00 20.00
Engineering, accounting, and management services 4086 33.33 0.00 33.33 33.33
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Table 6: Vesting Time (in Months) of the Options
This table reports the total time required to fully vest an option grant. Time is measured in months from
the date of issuance to the month at which the grant is fully vested. The summary statistics are computed
over all grants in the sample period. We organize the summary statistics by the two-digit firm-level SIC
categories as reported in CRSP.
Industry Number Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
of Grants Deviation
Chemicals and allied products 403811 17.21 10.76 0.00 79.00
Petroleum refining and related 516 12.00 0.00 12.00 12.00
Rubber and plastics products 358 36.38 2.92 25.00 48.00
Primary metal industries 19814 38.48 14.39 0.00 48.00
Fabricated metal products 254 54.59 15.98 0.00 72.00
Industrial machinery and computers 64900 47.63 8.26 12.00 72.00
Electronic and other electrical 31117 34.00 18.21 0.00 60.00
Transportation equipment 937 34.79 5.52 0.00 36.00
Measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments 12554 48.61 16.05 1.00 60.00
Miscellaneous manufacturing 17549 30.18 14.73 12.00 48.00
Communications 214621 7.11 13.28 0.00 121.00
Electric, gas, and sanitary services 1740 35.92 0.82 25.00 36.00
Wholesale trade - Durable goods 936 36.00 0.00 36.00 36.00
Wholesale trade - Non-durable goods 17871 15.02 15.37 0.00 48.00
General merchandise stores 8276 49.12 7.09 36.00 108.00
Eating and drinking places 8041 48.79 14.94 0.00 60.00
Miscellaneous retail 57652 35.85 1.59 0.00 36.00
Brokers, dealers,and exchanges 6602 35.98 0.96 1.00 48.00
Business services 6681 47.72 12.49 1.00 60.00
Amusement and recreation services 1393 45.76 9.99 0.00 48.00
Educational services 4221 59.99 0.27 50.00 60.00
Engineering, accounting, and management services 4086 36.00 0.16 26.00 36.00
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Table 7: Maturity of the Options (in months) at their Issuance Date
This table reports the maturity on option grants at the issuance date. The maturity is measured as the
number of months between the issuance date and the expiry date on the grant. The summary statistics
are computed over all grants in the sample period. We organize the summary statistics by the two-digit
firm-level SIC categories as reported in CRSP.
Industry Number Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
of Grants Deviation
Chemicals and allied products 403811 102.95 32.30 1.00 240.00
Petroleum refining and related 516 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
Rubber and plastics products 358 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
Primary metal industries 19814 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
Fabricated metal products 254 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
Industrial machinery and computers 64900 93.62 16.56 72.00 120.00
Electronic and other electrical 31117 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
Transportation equipment 937 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
Measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments 12554 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
Miscellaneous manufacturing 17549 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
Communications 214621 92.81 39.83 3.00 240.00
Electric, gas, and sanitary services 1740 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
Wholesale trade - Durable goods 936 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
Wholesale trade - Non-durable goods 17871 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
General merchandise stores 8276 165.66 25.59 120.00 180.00
Eating and drinking places 8041 120.01 0.49 120.00 151.00
Miscellaneous retail 57652 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
Brokers, dealers,and exchanges 6602 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
Business services 6681 111.88 29.33 6.00 120.00
Amusement and recreation services 1393 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
Educational services 4221 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
Engineering, accounting, and management services 4086 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
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Table 8: Remaining Term on the Option at the Time of Exercise
This table provides the summary statistics over the sample period for the remaining term (in days) on the
option at the date the option is exercised. The remaining term is measured as the difference between the
date of expiry and the exercise date. We organize the summary statistics by the two-digit firm-level SIC
categories as reported in CRSP.
Industry Number of Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Exercise Deviation
Events
Chemicals and allied products 262372 1555.9 1209.7 0.0 3613.0
Petroleum refining and related 441 2215.9 894.3 0.0 3283.0
Rubber and plastics products 385 1989.9 966.1 1.0 3525.0
Primary metal industries 13503 2553.5 634.0 0.0 3646.0
Fabricated metal products 32 254.7 341.8 0.0 1081.0
Industrial machinery and computers 31814 1466.2 912.9 0.0 3616.0
Electronic and other electrical 9549 3010.7 464.5 203.0 3636.0
Transportation equipment 1000 2760.5 457.9 408.0 3483.0
Measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments 10870 2428.1 669.0 0.0 3643.0
Miscellaneous manufacturing 7942 2673.8 678.3 0.0 3469.0
Communications 6523 1173.0 1165.4 0.0 3407.0
Electric, gas, and sanitary services 1644 2509.3 580.9 25.0 3469.0
Wholesale trade - Durable goods 65 2891.5 237.9 2316.0 3280.0
Wholesale trade - Non-durable goods 6160 2495.3 630.2 307.0 3515.0
General merchandise stores 6059 2907.8 1441.8 0.0 5292.0
Eating and drinking places 4891 1465.2 1186.7 0.0 3429.0
Miscellaneous retail 50948 2522.1 509.8 0.0 3643.0
Brokers, dealers,and exchanges 3900 1897.8 341.3 480.0 3638.0
Business services 5363 2335.9 955.2 0.0 3624.0
Amusement and recreation services 1842 2645.3 474.7 420.0 3385.0
Educational services 933 2265.5 597.7 872.0 3367.0
Engineering, accounting, and management services. 3135 1930.2 1018.8 0.0 3368.0
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Table 9: Number of Days that the Option was In-the-Money from the Vesting Day to the
Exercise Day
This table reports the summary statistics for the number of days that the option was in-the-money from
the vesting day on the options to the date of exercise. We sum all days between the vesting date and the
exercise date where the ratio of stock price to the strike price is greater than or equal to one. We organize
the summary statistics by the two-digit firm-level SIC categories as reported in CRSP.
Industry Number of Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Exercise Deviation
Events
Chemicals and allied products 262372 1205.4 1045.3 0.0 3663.0
Petroleum refining and related 441 818.4 661.3 0.0 3309.0
Rubber and plastics products 385 688.8 788.5 0.0 2561.0
Primary metal industries 13503 217.2 330.0 0.0 2210.0
Fabricated metal products 32 99.8 171.5 0.0 608.0
Industrial machinery and computers 31814 294.8 354.1 0.0 2216.0
Electronic and other electrical 9549 70.2 134.0 0.0 1366.0
Transportation equipment 1000 86.5 201.7 0.0 2162.0
Measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments 10870 242.2 419.6 0.0 2927.0
Miscellaneous manufacturing 7942 184.6 390.0 0.0 2205.0
Communications 6523 1830.7 1343.1 0.0 3988.0
Electric, gas, and sanitary services 1644 24.5 138.8 0.0 2002.0
Wholesale trade - Durable goods 65 47.8 101.1 0.0 357.0
Wholesale trade - Non-durable goods 6160 689.0 763.7 0.0 3206.0
General merchandise stores 6059 444.0 551.2 0.0 2217.0
Eating and drinking places 4891 105.1 199.6 0.0 2363.0
Miscellaneous retail 50948 113.2 219.9 0.0 2575.0
Brokers, dealers,and exchanges 3900 602.0 330.6 0.0 1699.0
Business services 5363 205.3 462.5 0.0 3612.0
Amusement and recreation services 1842 146.3 248.2 0.0 2541.0
Educational services 933 156.9 144.3 0.0 969.0
Engineering, accounting, and management services 3135 335.9 660.7 0.0 2565.0
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Table 10: Ratio of the Stock Price to the Strike Price at the Time of Exercise
This table reports summary statistics over the sample period for the ratio of the stock price to the strike
price (S/K) on the date the option is exercised. Both the price and the strike are adjusted for splits. We
organize the summary statistics by the two-digit firm-level SIC categories as reported in CRSP.
Industry Number of Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Exercise Deviation
Events
Chemicals and allied products 262372 3.48 1.18 1.00 13.92
Petroleum refining and related 441 1.95 0.89 1.01 9.22
Rubber and plastics products 385 1.64 0.41 1.00 3.59
Primary metal industries 13503 4.03 2.75 1.00 23.19
Fabricated metal products 32 3.19 2.41 1.03 8.76
Industrial machinery and computers 31814 3.46 2.18 1.00 29.66
Electronic and other electrical 9549 3.28 2.80 1.00 28.91
Transportation equipment 1000 4.08 2.14 1.53 21.62
Measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments 10870 3.49 2.18 1.00 21.51
Miscellaneous manufacturing 7942 2.07 0.82 1.00 9.82
Communications 6523 3.97 2.18 1.02 21.76
Electric, gas, and sanitary services 1644 2.06 0.55 1.06 7.77
Wholesale trade - Durable goods 65 1.79 0.93 1.05 5.39
Wholesale trade - Non-durable goods 6160 4.99 3.03 1.00 18.27
General merchandise stores 6059 3.69 2.89 1.00 21.43
Eating and drinking places 4891 1.69 0.77 1.00 10.17
Miscellaneous retail 50948 1.90 1.23 1.00 26.75
Brokers, dealers,and exchanges 3900 3.22 1.23 1.16 8.73
Business services 5363 3.91 3.75 1.01 24.53
Amusement and recreation services 1842 7.18 2.38 2.61 14.14
Educational services 933 2.04 1.17 1.01 6.60
Engineering, accounting, and management ser. 3135 3.92 3.14 1.01 17.31
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Table 11: Percentage of the Grant’s Vested Options That Are Exercised
This table reports the summary statistics for the percentage of each grant’s vested options that are exercised
on the date of exercise. The percentage is computed as the ratio of the number of options exercised to the
total number of number of vested options on the grant that are still unexercised. We then compute the
summary statistics using the total vested options outstanding to control for the size of the employee’s option
position. We organize the summary statistics by the two-digit firm-level SIC categories as reported in CRSP.
Industry Number of Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Exercise Deviation
Events
% % % %
Chemicals and allied products 262372 73.29 31.47 0.10 100.00
Petroleum refining and related 441 90.63 31.66 6.70 100.00
Rubber and plastics products 385 78.75 29.41 1.70 100.00
Primary metal industries 13503 66.22 26.52 0.10 100.00
Fabricated metal products 32 64.56 29.20 6.90 100.00
Industrial machinery and computers 31814 76.95 30.39 0.10 100.00
Electronic and other electrical 9549 51.87 22.81 0.20 100.00
Transportation equipment 1000 79.92 28.15 0.60 100.00
Measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments 10870 64.61 23.92 0.60 100.00
Miscellaneous manufacturing 7942 56.50 25.21 0.10 100.00
Communications 6523 34.46 17.41 0.20 100.00
Electric, gas, and sanitary services 1644 91.56 32.84 10.00 100.00
Wholesale trade - Durable goods 65 52.97 15.31 9.00 100.00
Wholesale trade - Non-durable goods 6160 87.23 31.87 1.60 100.00
General merchandise stores 6059 59.09 27.03 0.20 100.00
Eating and drinking places 4891 72.57 33.10 1.30 100.00
Miscellaneous retail 50948 40.63 17.62 0.10 100.00
Brokers, dealers,and exchanges 3900 79.97 28.43 3.30 100.00
Business services 5363 73.49 30.67 0.10 100.00
Amusement and recreation services 1842 75.37 28.84 7.70 100.00
Educational services 933 88.96 30.43 6.10 100.00
Engineering, accounting, and management services 3135 31.37 15.64 0.10 100.00
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Table 12: Summary Statistics for the Covariate Paths
This table reports the summary statistics for the employee-grant-day paths for option grants in the sample.
The price to strike ratio is the daily observation of the ratio of the split-adjusted price of the stock to the
split-adjusted strike price on the option (the zero valued minimum is due to our reporting precision). The
dividend payment is equal to the split-adjusted dividend payment on each day. This value is zero on all but
dividend payment days. The firm beta was estimated for each firm using market and firm data from CRSP
and interest rate data from the Federal Reserve Board over a five year interval (in some cases the interval is
shorter) and is a constant for each firm. The vesting period within two weeks is an indicator variable that is
one if the day is within two weeks of a vesting event and zero otherwise. The stock return volatility is the
standard deviation of the daily stock returns, as reported in CRSP, over the past thirty trading days. The
price relative to the 90th percentile is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the observed stock price is
greater than or equal to 90th percentile of the stock price distribution over the prior year of trading. It is
equal to zero otherwise.
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Price to Strike Ratio 1.7124 1.5972 0 31.226
Stock return volatility past thirty days 0.019922 0.011672 0.0016 0.1644
Dividend payment 0.0011888 0.024931 0 1
Firm Beta 1.0482 0.30754 0.21289 2.3403
Vesting event within two weeks (Indicator variable) 0.019675 0.13888 0 1
Price relative to 90th percentile (indicator variable) 0.59843 0.49022 0 1
Remaining time (days) 2,444 754.83 181 7319
n = 313,767,112
Table 13: Employee Demographics
This table presents summary statistics for the demographic information that is reported by a subset of the
firms in the sample. We summarize the information by employees over the sample period.
Number Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
of Employees Deviation
Salary 8096 167026.38 917499.24 9760.00 3683520.00
Sex 34470 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00
Age 62259 43.59 9.26 17.00 85.00
Executive 18683 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Other employee type 18683 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
Managers 18683 0.49 0.00 1.00
Board member 18683 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00
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Table 14: Cancellation Counts and Reasons for Cancellations
This table presents the total number of cancellation events for all firms over the sample period. Only some
of the firms reported the reason for cancellations. Of those firms that report the reason for the termination,
the category Terminate Position includes all cancellations arising from employment terminations that are
either voluntary or involuntary. The other categories that are reported include deaths and retirements. The
majority of cancellations do not have further information concerning the reason for the cancellation.
year Terminate Retirement Death Reason Total
Position Unknown
1983 0 0 0 0 4
1984 18 0 0 4 23
1985 2 1 0 2 8
1986 0 0 0 3 10
1987 5 0 0 5 14
1988 12 0 1 5 19
1989 19 0 0 2 27
1990 60 1 1 19 148
1991 149 2 47 774 996
1992 178 4 10 2040 11670
1993 142 1 19 873 8915
1994 153 2 98 459 8175
1995 358 3 101 1282 5768
1996 557 6 68 1036 17944
1997 932 5 58 25391 48235
1998 2121 10 308 15829 28661
1999 2452 22 52 6539 14931
2000 3189 34 138 4699 10315
2001 6145 37 133 14442 25760
2002 4754 37 141 4307 10260
2003 5797 44 156 8247 16707
2004 3932 52 179 16069 24664
2005 4518 39 322 62830 153771
Total 35493 300 1832 164857 387025
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Table 15: Estimation Results
This table presents the results for alternative specifications of the fractional logistic estimator. Specifications
1 and 2 are estimated on the full sample. In specification 1, we exclude both the sex and age covariates and
the firm fixed effects. Specification 2 includes firm fixed effects and again excludes the sex and age covariates.
Specifications 3 and 4 are estimated with a smaller subsample of firms that reported information on sex and
age. Specification 3 includes sex and age and excludes firm fixed effects. Specification 4 includes sex, age
and firm fixed effects. The standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The
estimator clusters at the level of the individual employee.
Alternative Specifications
Covariates 1 2 3 4
Constant -6.147 -10.594 -5.577 -6.359
(0.011) (0.053) (0.341)
Price to strike ratio 0.109 0.153 0.060 0.108
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Stock return volatility in prior 30 trading days -0.865 6.697 -4.156 2.792
(0.201) (0.586) (0.403)
Dividend payment within 14 trading days (Indicator Variable) -0.302 -7.375 7.586 24.807
(0.074) (9.670) (4.368)
Firm beta -0.128 2.211 0.181 -0.176
(0.008) (0.020) (0.437)
Vesting event in prior 14 calendar days (Indicator Variable) 2.266 2.357 3.586 3.725
(0.008) (0.014) (0.012)
Price ≥ 90th percentile of the prior 360 trading days (Indicator Variable) 0.062 -0.005 0.258 0.283
(0.005) (0.015) (0.008)
Remaining calendar days until expiration at the time of exercise 0.0005 0.0004 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.012 -0.010
(0.001) (0.000)
Sex -0.003 0.150
(0.017) (0.010)
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 313.8M 313.8M 67.6M 67.6M
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Table 16: Valuation Results.
The table shows option values for a 43-year old employee based on the estimated exercise rate function.
The initial stock price and strike price are $100. The option expires in ten years. The base case assumes
11.52% annual termination rate, two-year vesting period, 30% volatility, 1% dividend rate, and beta of one.
The riskless rate is 5% and the expected market return is 11%. FASB Approx is the probability that the
option vests times the Black-Scholes value of the option assuming expiration at the option’s average life
given vesting.
Male Employee Female Employee
Changing ESO Prob Av Vested FASB Percent ESO Prob Av Vested FASB Percent
Parameter Value Vest Life Approx Error Value Vest Life Approx Error
Termination Rate Effects
8.5% 27.86 0.84 5.53 28.46 2.15% 28.34 0.84 5.71 28.92 2.04%
10.0% 26.56 0.81 5.38 27.14 2.19% 27.00 0.81 5.55 27.56 2.10%
11.5% 25.30 0.78 5.23 25.86 2.20% 25.70 0.78 5.38 26.25 2.13%
13.0% 24.13 0.76 5.09 24.67 2.20% 24.50 0.76 5.24 25.03 2.15%
14.5% 23.00 0.73 4.95 23.50 2.19% 23.33 0.73 5.09 23.84 2.15%
Vesting Period Effects
1 26.28 0.88 4.63 27.48 4.56% 26.77 0.88 4.79 27.96 4.44%
2 25.30 0.78 5.23 25.86 2.20% 25.70 0.78 5.38 26.25 2.13%
3 23.91 0.69 5.82 24.13 0.92% 24.24 0.69 5.97 24.45 0.86%
4 22.37 0.61 6.40 22.38 0.03% 22.63 0.61 6.55 22.62 -0.03%
5 20.77 0.54 6.99 20.65 -0.57% 20.96 0.54 7.12 20.83 -0.62%
Volatility Effects
20% 20.62 0.78 5.22 20.39 -1.09% 20.96 0.78 5.39 20.77 -0.89%
30% 25.30 0.78 5.23 25.86 2.20% 25.70 0.78 5.38 26.25 2.13%
40% 29.63 0.78 5.20 31.24 5.43% 30.09 0.78 5.35 31.63 5.14%
50% 33.47 0.78 5.19 36.42 8.81% 33.98 0.78 5.32 36.81 8.31%
60% 36.95 0.78 5.18 41.32 11.84% 37.52 0.78 5.30 41.69 11.13%
Dividend Rate Effects
0% 27.92 0.78 5.21 28.81 3.20% 28.43 0.78 5.37 29.31 3.08%
1% 25.30 0.78 5.23 25.86 2.20% 25.70 0.78 5.38 26.25 2.13%
3% 20.69 0.78 5.23 20.59 -0.47% 20.90 0.78 5.39 20.81 -0.44%
5% 16.87 0.78 5.20 16.16 -4.20% 16.95 0.78 5.36 16.26 -4.07%
7% 13.80 0.78 5.13 12.54 -9.16% 13.80 0.78 5.29 12.56 -8.98%
 
Beta Effects
0.0 24.80 0.78 5.03 25.38 2.33% 25.23 0.78 5.55 26.64 5.59%
0.5 25.05 0.78 5.13 25.62 2.26% 25.47 0.78 5.46 26.44 3.80%
1.0 25.30 0.78 5.23 25.86 2.20% 25.70 0.78 5.38 26.25 2.13%
1.5 25.54 0.78 5.32 26.09 2.16% 25.92 0.78 5.31 26.08 0.60%
2.0 25.77 0.78 5.41 26.31 2.12% 26.14 0.78 5.25 25.93 -0.78%
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